1. Introduction

Temperance is sometimes mistakenly understood as self-denial or restraint; however, it is a virtue that is linked to creating harmony in our desires and actions. This paper argues that from Aristotelian and Thomistic standpoints, temperance serves not only to control impulses but also to align desires with reason, creating a balanced and morally virtuous life. This integration is not about the suppression of natural desires but giving them a positive direction, which should correspond to the principle of a harmonious, rational, and moral way of life.

In this paper, I first present my full argument structure before moving into a detailed discussion of the rationales. I then examine how Aristotle frames temperance as a virtue that finds its mean between excess and deficiency and how Aquinas extends this view through his argument for the unification of desires with rational goals. I then discuss some common objections (such as those arguing temperance is too constricting or culturally relative) and respond to these objections, showing why this virtue remains relevant to moral development regardless of context.

2. Argument

  1. If temperance is essential for balancing human desires with reason, then it is crucial for achieving moral virtue.

  2. Temperance is essential for balancing human desires with reason.

  3. Therefore, temperance is crucial for achieving moral virtue.

Rationales:

Premise 1

Temperance serves as a foundational virtue because it ensures desires are properly integrated into moral reasoning. Nicholas Austin argues that temperance plays a key role in moral development by allowing rational control over impulses, preventing both excess and deficiency. By aligning desires with rational goals, temperance ensures that individuals can practice other virtues effectively. This connection makes it a prerequisite for moral virtue rather than just a standalone trait.

Premise 2

Temperance is essential for balancing human desires with reason. Aristotle describes temperance as a mean between excess and deficiency, regulating desires in accordance with rational principles. He states, “temperance is a mean with regard to pleasures (or pains)” (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk III, Ch 10). Aquinas expands this view, arguing that temperance integrates desires into a structured and rational moral framework.

To illustrate, consider Aristotle’s example of eating: a temperate person consumes food in a way that satisfies hunger but does not indulge in gluttony or complete abstinence. This ability to regulate desires ensures a well-balanced life. By balancing pleasures with rational limits, temperance acts as a guide for moral decision-making, ensuring that desires do not interfere with one’s ability to pursue virtue.

3. Aristotle on Temperance

Aristotle saw temperance as a middle state between excess and deficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics. According to Aristotle, moral virtue involves finding an appropriate mean that conforms with reason. He states:

“The mean relative to us, this mean being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk II, Ch 6).

To illustrate how temperance functions, consider the activity of eating. According to Aristotle’s model, temperance would involve consuming enough food to satisfy hunger without overeating or abstaining entirely. For example, a person who practices temperance may enjoy a few pieces of dessert after dinner rather than eating an entire cake or abstaining altogether. This balance aligns with Aristotle’s concept of the “mean” since it respects bodily pleasure without taking extreme directions.

Charles Young highlights Aristotle’s distinction between common appetites—those necessary for survival—and peculiar appetites, which are unique to individuals. Aristotle argues that temperance applies primarily to peculiar appetites because common appetites naturally regulate themselves once satiated. This distinction reinforces that temperance is not simply about control but about knowing when and how to satisfy desires in a way that aligns with reason.

4. Aquinas’ Causal View of Temperance

Aquinas took the view that temperance was a cardinal virtue since it is foundational for other virtues. The term “cardinal” comes from the Latin word for “hinge,” meaning temperance is a pivotal virtue upon which others depend. Nicholas Austin explains that for Aquinas, temperance is not about repression but about actively transforming one’s desires so that they align with moral virtue.

Austin uses the metaphor of a riverbank to describe temperance:

“The ‘boundaries’ recognized by temperance do not merely defend against excess but channel moral energy to its destination.”

This suggests that temperance does not just hold desires in check but actively refines them so that they contribute to moral development rather than acting as obstacles.

Unlike Aristotle, who primarily focuses on bodily pleasures, Aquinas broadens the scope of temperance to include desires of the mind and spirit. This suggests that temperance is more than simple restraint; it is about cultivating desires in a way that enhances rational and moral decision-making.

5. Objections and Responses

Objection 1: Temperance Overemphasizes Restraint

A common objection is that temperance is a controlling virtue, limiting personal freedom and spontaneity. Critics argue that too much emphasis on temperance could stifle creativity or courage—virtues that rely on action rather than restraint.

However, from what Aquinas and Nicholas Austin’s analysis of temperance reveals, this virtue is not just about restraint but also involves an active integration of desires with rational goals. It promotes a non-oppressive balance that allows desires to serve an actual purpose instead of becoming obstacles to moral growth. Thus, temperance should be seen as a means to authentic self-realization rather than an external restriction.

Objection 2: Is Temperance Independent of Wisdom?

Some argue that temperance cannot be foundational for virtue because wisdom is equally, if not more, important. If temperance is about aligning desires with reason, then one could argue that reason itself—guided by wisdom—is the true foundation of moral virtue. Can we have temperance without wisdom? Or does temperance require wisdom to function correctly?

One response is that while wisdom helps define rational goals, temperance provides the discipline necessary to enact them. A person may know that self-restraint is beneficial, but without temperance, they might fail to act accordingly. For example, an athlete understands the benefits of training but struggles to maintain discipline without temperance. Thus, while wisdom provides direction, temperance ensures action, making it indispensable to moral virtue.

Objection 3: Temperance is Culturally Relative

Some argue that temperance is not a universal virtue because different cultures define moderation differently. However, while expressions of temperance may differ, the core principle remains the same—aligning desires with reason.

For example:

  • In Italy, temperance may manifest as savoring long meals without overindulgence.

  • In Japan, it could be reflected in the practice of mindfulness and moderation in all aspects of life.

  • In Indigenous cultures, temperance may be seen in taking only what is needed from nature to maintain balance with the environment.

These diverse expressions reinforce that temperance is a universal virtue, adaptable across different cultures while maintaining its essential purpose.

6. Conclusion

Rather than suppressing passions, temperance allows for their fulfillment in a way that aligns with ethical principles, making it indispensable for moral development.